

1
3 THE SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF
5 MIDDLE-CLASS FORMATION IN
7 POSTAPARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: AU :2
9 ENCLAVIZATION AND
11 FRAGMENTATION IN
13 JOHANNESBURG AU :3
15

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19

21 ABSTRACT

23 *In this chapter we argue that South Africa's premier city, Johannesburg,*
25 *has undergone a massive reconfiguration of its social geography since the*
27 *demise of formal apartheid. Using census data and geographic information*
29 *systems (GIS), we present evidence that this spatial transformation*
31 *has been driven by a process of residential deracialization but one that*
33 *has taken place within narrow class bands. Indeed, we show that change*
35 *has been marked by a new process of middle-class formation that has*
specifically taken the form of what we call middle-class enclavization. We
show moreover that this process of enclavization is marked by internal
fragmentation with the increasing spatial compartmentalization of
different fractions of the middle class. These findings in turn support
broader arguments in the literature that emphasize the strategic practices,

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1 *including the centrality of residential location, through which upper*
2 *middle-class privilege is preserved.*

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7 As one drives north on Johannesburg's M1 motorway passing the city center
8 and into what are known as the northern suburbs, the massive spatial
9 transformation of the city's social geography is immediately revealed. Just
10 past the strip of leafy neighborhoods at the northern edge of the Central
11 Business District (CBD) that have traditionally housed Johannesburg's
12 bourgeoisie, one enters a more modern landscape of large mall complexes
13 and housing developments that have been growing rapidly since the 1970s.
14 These new and generally quite exclusive residential areas are clustered
15 around Sandton, a self-contained business center complete with five-star
16 hotels, corporate headquarters, and a high-security luxury mall rendered in
17 an Italian Renaissance theme. Home to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
18 (JSE), which moved from the CBD in 1994, Sandton has grown as rapidly as
19 the CBD had declined. Continuing on past Sandton's sharply profiled
20 skyline, it is possible to miss the township of Alexandra, the one area of
21 concentrated (black) poverty in the otherwise immaculate enclave of middle-
22 class prosperity that envelops the M1 through Sandton and beyond. And
23 what one finds beyond Sandton is in some ways even more startling. In an
24 expanse that runs all the way to an area known as Midrand, a landscape
25 that was only recently gently rolling pastures and still features the occasional
26 farm but is now dominated by a series of seemingly endless low-lying
27 compounds that enclose shopping areas, residential estates, and business
28 clusters. The pace of change has been so dizzying that Johannesburg is now
29 possibly the most sprawled city in the world.¹

30 But what does this spatial transformation tell us more generally about
31 postapartheid South Africa? In this chapter we argue that the transforma-
32 tion of the northern areas of the city is an integral part of a larger process of
33 post-Fordist class restructuring. Specifically, using census data and
34 geographic information systems (GIS), we present evidence that this spatial
35 transformation has been driven by a new process of middle-class formation
36 that has specifically taken the form of what we call middle-class
37 enclavization. We show moreover that this process of enclavization is
38 marked by internal fragmentation with the increasing spatial compartmen-
39 talization of different fractions of the middle class. In presenting this
evidence we also try to develop some broader claims about the spatial
dimensions of socioeconomic transformation in postapartheid South Africa.

1 On the one hand, we argue that South Africa's premiere city and the
3 gateway city to Southern Africa has undergone a massive reconfiguration of
5 its social geography that is a result of both economic transformation and the
7 demise of formal apartheid. On the other hand, drawing on census data
9 from 1996 and 2001 we show that even as the class structure has been
11 transformed, when it comes to the overall pattern of social inequality
13 Johannesburg gives full expression to the old adage that the more things
15 change the more they stay the same. Though the spatial logic of the
17 apartheid city began to dissolve well before the end of apartheid, residential
deracialization has clearly accelerated since the removal of the formal racial
zoning that was the central organizing principle of the apartheid regime. But
as we shall see, deracialization has taken place within narrow class bands,
and in class terms Johannesburg is as spatially divided as it has ever been. So
how does one reconcile the observable change with the clear evidence of the
social inertia of apartheid? The answer, as we shall see, is that on the whole,
middle-class privilege has largely been preserved and even fortified, both
literally and figuratively. But, it has done so through a very dynamic process
of internal differentiation that has distinct spatial characteristics.

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21

MIDDLE-CLASS FORMATION AND RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL

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25 Theoretical debates about the definition of the middle class are legion.² Our
27 concern here is less about getting the category right than about capturing
29 key dynamics of class restructuring at a critical historical juncture. Postapartheid South Africa presents a unique lens for capturing the
31 dynamics of middle-class formation in the Global South. Theoretically, we
33 work from the premise that thinking about class should be focused on actual
35 processes of formation. If much of the literature has been trapped at either
37 end of Marx's famous dichotomy of *class in itself* (structurally defined) and
39 *for itself* (as politically self-aware), we argue, following recent developments
in class theory, for a focus on the practice of class (Bourdieu, 1984, 1985;
Savage, Barlow, Dickens, & Fielding, 1992), a focus that calls for examining
the various mechanisms and strategies through which class boundaries are
made, adapted, and reproduced. In other words, rather than try to
understand how a class is structured in some fundamental way, or how it
represents itself, we are interested in how class is made *through itself*. This
approach is especially well suited to the context of developing societies,

1 where patterns of class formation are highly fluid and do not necessarily
2 conform to patterns of class formation associated with first-generation
3 industrializers (Fernandes & Heller, 2006).

4 In the class practices or class reproduction literature, class formation is
5 understood as a dynamic process of asset accumulation and combination.
6 Following Wright's original contribution (1985) and drawing on Bourdieu
7 and Savage et al. (1992), we argue that classes are constituted of bundles of
8 organizational, economic, and cultural/educational assets. A framework
9 that focuses on how assets are actively reproduced is especially useful in
10 understanding middle-class formation. Definitional disputes aside, there is a
11 broad consensus that the status or material well-being of the middle class is
12 not derived primarily from property (the bourgeoisie) but rather from other
13 power-conferring resources such as organizational authority or possession
14 of valued skills that are either embodied (cultural capital) or institutiona-
15 lized (educational capital in the form of credentials).³ A critical difference
16 between the bourgeoisie and the middle class is that if property is an asset
17 that is by definition readily stored and transmitted, organizational assets
18 and cultural/educational capital have to be converted into wealth. Middle-
19 class practices are thus centrally about securing returns to organizational
20 assets and educational capital. Given the central role that the state has
21 played in many late developing economies, securing returns or scarcity rents
22 to organizational assets (the managerial class) or educational assets (the
23 professional class) has played a particularly large role in class formation **AU:7**
(Bardhan, 1983). The transition to a post-Fordist economy more generally
24 has only accentuated the premium placed on organization and information.
25 This is the sense in which Bourdieu (1984) argues that under postindustrial
26 capitalism, class struggle is increasingly about classification struggles, that
27 is, struggles over the rates of return to various capitals.

28 A comprehensive approach to understanding middle-class practices
29 would require fine-grained qualitative data as well as a range of aggregate
30 data. In this chapter we limit our analysis to the spatial dimension of
31 middle-class formation. There is a long tradition among urban sociologists
32 and geographers of exploring the spatial dimensions of class power
33 (Castells, 1996; Harvey, 1985). This tradition, which has tended to
34 emphasize the role that capital plays in the making of the urban spatial
35 form, can be integrated with theories of class reproduction that also take
36 into account the social and cultural dimensions of class action. Residential
37 spatial patterns are a key link between these two perspectives insofar as they
38 are both driven by patterns of investment and are also a critical constitutive
39 element of class. Not only is housing "a major marker of class" in itself

1 (Nijman, 2006), but residential location also shapes access to cultural
3 capital, social networks, and highly differentiated public and private
5 services. In other words, different residential locations bring different
7 social, economic, cultural, and even political returns. Indeed, as sociologists
9 have long argued, even when controlling for income, education, and race,
11 space by itself is an important causal determinant of intergenerational
13 mobility (Massey & Denton, 1993). In this sense then, residence is not a
15 choice. It is a strategy. Residential location is about storing and amplifying
17 existing assets by embedding them in a particular spatially bounded social
19 setting that carries with it access to valuable social and cultural networks
21 and access to useful infrastructure (libraries, roads) and institutions
23 (schools). As economists might put it, residential choice is lumpy, in that
25 choices about home, work, social life, schooling, and status all get lumped
together. Recent work by sociologists and geographers has underscored this
point (Robson & Butler, 1995; Nijman, 2006; Savage et al., 1992). Savage
and his colleagues (1992), who have produced seminal work on middle-class
formation in England, point out that “one’s residence is a crucial, possibly
the crucial, identifier of who you are. The sorting processes by which people
chose to live in certain places and others leave is at the heart of
contemporary battles over social distinction” (cited in Atkinson, 2006,
p. 822). A case in point is the recent explosion in the urban literature of
work on gentrification, a classic instance of a residential strategy for
conferring status. In sum, we would argue that residential location is the
classification struggle par excellence.

27 **CLASS, SPACE, AND RACE IN JOHANNESBURG**

29 Johannesburg is an incredibly young city. It began as little more than a
31 mining camp in 1886 and within a decade was thought to be the largest
33 urban place in Southern Africa (Beavon, 2004). By 1919, Johannesburg was
35 producing an astounding 40% of the world’s gold. Its subsequent
37 metamorphosis from a mining city to a manufacturing city to a hub of
financial and services activity has been nothing short of dizzying. But
through all these stages, Johannesburg has been marked by a stark
geographical divide. The early division of the south of the city for mining
and the north for commercial and residential purposes continues to be the
defining spatial feature of the city. As a direct expression of the racially
inscribed class logic of the mining economy, this geographical divide was
most starkly manifest in the concentration of the African population of

1 mineworkers in a dormitory city that would become Soweto just south of
the mining strip, and the growth of leafy suburbs such as Parktown and
3 Houghton Estate as areas of white privilege just north of the commercial
city center. Despite the subsequent decline of the mining sector, this spatial
5 divide was reproduced and reinforced through apartheid policy. During the
mid-20th century, manufacturing began to supplant mining as the city's
7 dominant economic activity. Industrial development was concentrated to
the east of the mining belt, just south of the CBD, moving opportunities for
9 unskilled employment further from the townships in the southwestern part
of the city (Beall, Crankshaw, & Parnell, 2002). However, racially inscribed
11 residential patterns remained unchanged as the introduction of official
apartheid during this period maintained and reinforced the racial divide.

13 With the government's adoption of neoliberal economic policies in the
1970s, efforts to foster export-led industrial growth faltered, and instead
15 South Africa saw reduced domestic manufacturing output and disinvest-
ment among foreign firms (Beall et al., 2002). Compounded by apartheid-
17 era trade sanctions and global economic downturns, the domestic
manufacturing economy witnessed a sharp decline. In Johannesburg, this
19 was accompanied by a simultaneous growth in the service economy,
marking a shift from a Fordist to post-Fordist economy (Crankshaw &
21 Parnell, 2004). By 2004, the finance and service industries contributed about
three and a half times as much to the city's total gross value added as
23 manufacturing industries (South African Cities Network, 2006). The forms
of class restructuring associated with this post-Fordist shift have received
25 significant attention in the literature. In the most influential argument, the
move from manufacturing employment to a service economy drives an
27 increasingly polarized class structure in which a large number of middle-
income manufacturing jobs disappear while job growth takes place in either
29 high-income financial and informational service positions or the low-wage
jobs that service the needs of this growing professional class (Sassen, 2001).
31 This post-Fordist class restructuring hollows out the middle-income group
while increasing the ranks of the upper and lower ends of the occupational
33 structure, resulting in class polarization. However, the extent to which this
polarization is taking place in South Africa is up for debate.

35 In examining the growing number of routine white-collar jobs created by
a similar process of deindustrialization in Cape Town, Borel-Saladin and
37 Crankshaw (2008) find that the polarization hypothesis tends to be
overstated. Their analysis shows that while manufacturing jobs are
39 declining, they are largely being replaced by service positions with a similar
income structure, suggesting that the lower end of the middle class is not

1 necessarily being hollowed out in South Africa but is instead experiencing
changes in the types of occupations in which its members are employed.

3 In Johannesburg, the transition from a manufacturing to a finance and
service economy was intertwined with a shift in the city's pattern of spatial
5 development. The city's postapartheid spatial form can be traced back to the
1970s when saturation of the downtown area and the adjacent suburbs
7 drove developers north. In what Beavon has called the "great trek to the
northern suburbs" (2004, p. 255), all new office space, malls, and all of the
9 CBD's luxury hotels migrated north, capped off by the JSE's relocation to
Sandton in 2000. The pace of this shift accelerated with the demise of the
11 apartheid regime.⁴ As these developments catered to the upper end of the
burgeoning service economy, the center of economic activity moved further
13 away from the poor and working-class neighborhoods south of the city and
toward the new middle-class growth nodes of the northern suburbs.

15 This shift toward a post-Fordist economy was also associated with racial
changes in terms of class and residential patterns. Apartheid-era legislation
17 effectively reserved access to white-collar and professional jobs for whites,
whereas the ranks of mining and factory employees were largely comprised
19 of underpaid blacks working in hazardous conditions. The shift to a service
economy in the 1970s in Johannesburg began to slowly break down this
21 strict racial segregation in terms of employment, even as the apartheid
regime maintained political power (Crankshaw, 1996). The new service
23 economy increased the demand for routine white-collar workers beyond a
level that could be supplied by the white labor force. Even prior to the end
25 of apartheid, as demand for service sector employment outstripped the size
of the white labor force, Africans were recruited to fill these positions and
27 saw a limited amount of class mobility (Crankshaw, 1996). This meant that
the state needed to play an important role in educating blacks for
29 employment in these positions, thus increasing the need for black teachers
and health-care providers in the townships. These dynamics created the
31 beginnings of a multiracial routine white-collar class. However, Crankshaw
(1996) argues that under apartheid the upward mobility of blacks could only
33 proceed to the extent that whites were moving up into more lucrative careers
and demand for lower paying jobs exceeded the availability of whites to fill
35 those positions, creating what he terms a "floating color bar."

With these economic changes and the easing of strict enforcement of
37 apartheid residential restrictions, Johannesburg began to experience
"graying" in particular areas of the city, such as Hillbrow, where blacks
39 began to move into white neighborhoods (Morris, 1994), which were better
serviced, more prestigious, and more centrally located than the townships.

1 The de facto end of enforced segregation in the 1980s, the repeal of the
3 Group Areas Act in 1991, and the end of white majority rule in 1994 saw
5 more rapid changes in the racial composition of vast areas of the city. The
7 CBD and surrounding areas flipped from majority white to majority black
9 and boundary areas between the formerly white north and nonwhite south
11 were increasingly settled by upwardly mobile Africans, coloreds, and
13 Indians/Asians, while the wealthier segments of these racial groups began to
15 move into some of the more upscale northern suburbs.

17 Postapartheid racial mixing in middle-class neighborhoods was likely
19 hastened by policies such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and
21 affirmative action programs, which sought to deracialize the South African
23 class structure (Southall, 2007; Naidoo, 2008), thereby providing nonwhites
25 the potential economic means to move from the townships into better-off
27 communities. Evidence suggests that in the context of these programs, there
29 has been a significant movement of blacks into the middle and upper middle
class in South Africa with black Africans making up 29% of the middle class
in 1994 and about 50% in 2000 (Garcia-Rivero, du Toit, & Kotze, 2003).
However, while BEE, which incentivizes black ownership of the commanding
heights of the economy, has made progress in redistributing capital among
nonwhites, it is argued that these benefits have been concentrated among
a small group of politically connected elites (Southall, 2007). At the same
time, while affirmative action legislation such as the Employment Equity
Act of 1998 has institutionalized efforts to create a more racially
representative public service, it seems to have resulted in the concentration
of Africans among the lower ranks as opposed to upper level management
(Naidoo, 2008). As the transition from Fordism reshapes how classes are
constructed and postapartheid policies provide greater residential and class
mobility to black South Africans, it is important to examine how the
country's middle class has changed both spatially and racially.

31

DATA AND METHODS

33

35 Our examination of changes in the composition and distribution of the
37 middle class in Johannesburg uses census data collected by Statistics South
39 Africa (StatsSA). Using GIS software we are able to complement descriptive
analyses of changes in the middle class with an examination of the spatial
dynamics of these phenomena across the city. Data from the 1996 census –
the first complete postapartheid census – are compared with data from the
2001 census – the most recent. Most of the current literature on South

1 African cities that relies on census data aggregates that data to the city level.
 2 Because we are interested in the spatial dynamics of middle-class formation,
 3 much of our analysis is conducted at the level of a census subplace, the
 4 South African equivalent of the census tract and the smallest unit for which
 5 the data are publically available in both years. In contrast to census tracts,
 6 South African subplaces are defined according to recognizable named
 7 neighborhoods.^{5,6}

8 The measure of class used in this chapter follows a categorization based
 9 on occupational categories in the census. Our categorization is similar to
 10 that used by Crankshaw (2008; see Table 1), which includes managers,
 11 senior officials, professionals, associate professionals, and technicians as
 12 part of the middle class. In order to disaggregate the middle class and
 13 examine variation within the class itself, we have divided these occupational
 14 groups into two categories, (1) an upper middle class, which includes
 15 legislators, managers, senior officials, and professionals and (2) a middle
 16 middle class, which includes associate professionals and technicians. In
 17 addition to these groupings, we have created a lower middle-class category
 18 that includes clerk and service and sales occupations. A complete list of the
 19 occupations included in each category can be found in the appendix.

21 **Table 1.** Occupational Structure of Johannesburg. AU:1

23 Occupation	% 1996 (n)	% 2001 (n)	Change 2001–1996
25 Legislators, senior officials, managers	6.44 (54,831)	8.42 (85,599)	1.98
27 Professionals	11.44 (97,448)	11.25 (114,314)	-0.19
29 Technicians and associate professionals	9.10 (77,531)	10.50 (106,762)	1.40
31 Clerks	11.74 (100,014)	14.53 (147,681)	2.79
33 Service and sales occupations	12.56 (107,009)	13.72 (139,406)	1.16
35 Agriculture and fishing	1.93 (16,458)	0.60 (6,143)	-1.33
37 Craft and trade occupations	16.51 (140,683)	11.76 (119,487)	-4.75
39 Plant and machine operators and assemblers	8.14 (69,341)	7.18 (72,954)	-0.96
Elementary occupations	22.14 (188,655)	22.04 (224,011)	-0.10
N	851,970	1,016,357	164,387

1 As in any classification system, there is a certain amount of arbitrariness
associated with defining occupations and clumping occupations into middle-
3 class tiers. But our categorizations do follow the well-established socio-
logical tradition in relational class analysis of differentiating class fractions
5 by the degree and type of power and authority they enjoy in the class
hierarchy. The upper middle class is constituted of occupations that carry
7 significant power and authority over complex organizations, be they in the
private or public sector. The middle middle class category consists of
9 associate professionals who possess scarce credentials and enjoy significant
returns to those credentials both in terms of income and authority. The
11 lower middle class category consists of semiskilled white-collar workers who
are substitutable, may not enjoy job protection, and find themselves at the
13 bottom of the organizational hierarchy. The inclusion of this category is
highly debated in the literature. Sassen (2001) and others treat these workers
15 as semiskilled and low-income and argue that because their wages are lower
than those of skilled manufacturing workers, the growth of this semiskilled
17 service class points to increasing social polarization with deindustrialization.
Goldthorpe (1997) on the other hand has explicitly categorized routine
19 nonmanual workers as “intermediate” classes. For South Africa, Borel-
Saladin and Crankshaw (2008) provide clear evidence that refutes the social
21 polarization thesis, showing that while semiskilled service work is increasing
and manufacturing jobs are decreasing, wages in the service jobs are in fact
23 as good as and even slightly better than for skilled manufacturing. We
remain agnostic about whether semiskilled service workers are properly
25 treated as part of the middle class or not. Clearly, while this class fraction
must not be lumped in with managers and professionals, and indeed in class
27 terms stands in a subservient position to these higher class fractions, they
cannot be lumped into a traditional working-class category either. Our
29 approach begins with the recognition that class categories are useful to the
extent that they capture boundaries and divisions that correspond with
31 other important variables. In the end, we chose to include the lower middle
class in our analysis for two specific reasons. First, as Borel-Saladin and
33 Crankshaw (2008) show, this class is indeed replacing the organized
manufacturing class, which as Seekings and Natrass have influentially
35 argued was the mainstay of the black middle class at the end of apartheid
(2005, Chap. 7). In income terms this class fraction is quite literally in the
37 middle.⁷ Second, as we shall see, not only is the size of this segment of the
middle class growing rapidly, but it is also developing distinct character-
39 istics. In racial terms, this is the most representative class in South Africa,
more or less mirroring the overall racial distribution of the country and in

1 the context of Johannesburg, it has also developed a specific residential
profile, especially when compared to other classes.

3 Our analysis of the middle class in Johannesburg proceeds in two steps,
both of which include a comparative examination of changes in class and
5 spatial composition across time. First, using census data, we provide a
general description of the various segments of the middle class across
7 postapartheid Johannesburg. This includes examining the class composition
of the city as a whole as well as the racial and economic demographics
9 across each segment of the middle class. The second phase of analysis
examines the spatial distribution of the middle class across the city.

11
13 **TRANSFORMATION AND CLASS RESTRUCTURING**
15 **IN POSTAPARTHEID JOHANNESBURG**

17 The democratic transition in South Africa has been accompanied by two
simultaneous transformations. The first is the end of the apartheid regime
19 itself and the removal of all legally enforced measures of racial segregation
as well as proactive measures by a black majority state with significant
21 capacities to undo the legacies of apartheid. The second is accelerated
economic transformation. South Africa has become far more integrated into
23 the global economy, but the shift from a Fordist manufacturing economy to
a service-dominated economy has accelerated. Both of these transformative
25 processes had dramatic effects on South Africa's class structure and
Johannesburg's social geography.

27 The post-Fordist shift in the occupational structure of the city is
highlighted in Table 1, which shows that between the 1996 and 2001
29 censuses, employment in service and clerking occupations has increased,
whereas employment in manufacturing (plant and machine operators and
31 assemblers) and craft and trade occupations has declined.

Table 1 provides the foundation for examining postapartheid patterns of
33 change among Johannesburg's middle class throughout the rest of this
chapter. As described previously, the upper middle class category used in
35 this analysis is composed of the legislators, senior officials, and managers
category as well as the professionals category. The middle middle class is
37 composed of the technicians and associate professionals and the lower
middle class includes the clerks and service and sales occupations. Table 2
39 shows that between 1996 and 2001, the size of the middle class in
Johannesburg grew both in raw numbers as well as proportionate to the

1 **Table 2.** Middle Class in Johannesburg.

3 Middle-class category	% of Employed – 1996 (<i>n</i>)	% of Employed – 2001 (<i>n</i>)	Change 2001–1996
5 Upper middle class	17.88 (152,279)	19.67 (199,913)	1.79 (47,634)
7 Middle middle class	9.10 (77,531)	10.50 (106,762)	1.40 (29,231)
9 Lower middle class	24.30 (207,023)	28.25 (287,087)	3.95 (80,064)
11 <i>N</i>	436,833	593,762	156,929

13 employed population, with the largest growth among the lower middle class.
 14 By 2001, the lower middle class of clerks and service and sales operators had
 15 surpassed the manufacturing class (craft and trade occupations as well as
 16 plant and machine operators) in absolute size.

17 To evaluate the distributive implications of these changes in the class
 18 structure, we use census data to examine the average monthly income for
 19 each of these middle-class segments in Johannesburg in both years.⁸ Using
 20 2001 census data for Johannesburg, Fig. 1 provides an indication of the gap
 21 between different middle-class fractions and supports Borel-Saladin and
 22 Crankshaw's (2008) argument that lower middle-class incomes are compar-
 23 able to if not higher than the incomes of manufacturing jobs.⁹

25 *Race and Class*

27 With the collapse of apartheid and the rise to power of the ANC, the state
 28 has played an active role in fostering the growth of a black middle class **AU:11**
 29 through BEE and affirmative action programs. Both of these programs offer
 30 the potential to overcome the floating color bar by creating space for blacks
 31 in the upper levels of the class structure as well as incentivizing nonwhite
 32 employment throughout the middle class. While it is difficult to gauge the
 33 impact of these policies, shifts in the racial composition of public sector
 34 employees have been decisive. For example, between 1993 and 2003, the
 35 percentage of Africans in the national civil service rose from 41 to 63,
 36 whereas the percentage of whites dropped from 38 to 23 (Southall, 2007, p.
 37 7). It is important, however, to more closely examine the degree to which
 38 each segment of the middle class has experienced racial change. Tables 3–5
 39 show that between 1996 and 2001, the racial composition of the middle class **AU:12**




Fig. 1. Monthly Income and Class in Johannesburg.

Table 3. Racial Composition of Upper Middle Class.

	1996 (n)	2001 (n)	Change 2001–1996
% African	32.28 (48,720)	28.38 (56,727)	–3.90 (8,007)
% Colored	5.34 (8,055)	5.49 (10,971)	0.15 (2,916)
% Indian	7.17 (10,825)	9.94 (19,865)	2.77 (9,040)
% White	55.21 (83,333)	56.20 (112,350)	0.99 (29,017)
Total	150,933	199,913	48,980

in Johannesburg is changing significantly, but this change is occurring at different rates within each middle-class segment.

Within the upper middle class, nonwhites make up a substantial portion of the population (44.79% in 1996 and 43.81% in 2001). Between 1996 and 2001, the proportion of Indians, in particular, increases dramatically. While

Table 4. Racial Composition of Middle Middle Class.

	1996 (<i>n</i>)	2001 (<i>n</i>)	Change 2001–1996
% African	35.33 (27,175)	46.28 (49,412)	10.95 (22,237)
% Colored	6.93 (5,330)	7.41 (7,914)	0.48 (2,584)
% Indian	6.40 (4,925)	7.11 (7,587)	0.71 (2,662)
% White	51.34 (39,484)	39.20 (41,849)	–12.14 (2,365)
Total	76,914	106,762	29,848

Table 5. Racial Composition of Lower Middle Class.

	1996 (<i>n</i>)	2001 (<i>n</i>)	Change 2001–1996
% African	59.14 (121,549)	63.89 (183,429)	4.75 (61,880)
% Colored	7.94 (16,320)	7.94 (22,808)	0.0 (6,488)
% Indian	5.71 (11,740)	6.61 (18,979)	0.9 (7,239)
% White	27.21 (55,917)	21.55 (61,872)	–5.66 (5,955)
Total	205,526	287,088	81,562

increasing in raw numbers, the African portion of this class segment decreases proportionately between 1996 and 2001,¹⁰ whereas whites and coloreds show a slight increase (see Table 3). The absolute increase in the numbers of the white upper middle class is quite surprising, especially given the well-documented phenomenon of white flight abroad. The ability of whites to maintain and even improve their position at the top of the class hierarchy points to their accumulated advantages in cultural and educational capital, but also suggests that state efforts to deracialize the upper middle class have either not been as aggressive or as successful as often argued.¹¹ Overall, this underscores a logic of “displacement of the structure of distributions” that Bourdieu (1984, p. 165) emphasized as central to classification struggles – as a subordinate group moves up the hierarchy of positions, the position itself is devalorized as the dominant group moves up.

1 As seen in Table 4, it is among the middle middle class that the most
2 significant change in the percent of the population that is African occurs.
3 Here the African portion of the population shows an increase of almost 11
4 percentage points. There are also smaller increases in the percentage of this
5 class segment that is colored and Indian, accompanied by a relatively large
6 decline in the percent white, making this category a key site of racial change.

7 Finally, Table 5 shows that significant racial change is also occurring
8 within the lower middle class. Here, the percent African is increasing by
9 almost five percentage points. At the same time, this category is seeing a
10 dramatic decline in the percent white.

11 These findings suggest that, while the size of the African upper middle
12 class is larger than the African population of the middle middle class – as
13 suggested by Garcia-Rivero et al. (2003) – this upper middle-class
14 population shows a slight proportionate decline. Within the upper middle
15 class, Indians are seeing the largest proportionate increases. It is within the
16 middle and lower middle class that the most substantial growth of the
17 African middle class is occurring.

Class and Space

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21 Previous research suggests that the end of apartheid has brought about
22 significant mobility of black South Africans into the middle class, which the
23 data we have presented here largely support. While this dynamic has created
24 a multiracial elite in South Africa, many have argued that it is also
25 contributing to increased class polarization. If polarization has not played
26 itself out in income terms as we showed earlier (the lower middle class is not
27 earning less than the working class it has displaced), there is reason to
28 believe that it has manifested itself spatially. With the decline of the mining
29 and manufacturing industries located in the southern part of the city, jobs
30 traditionally held by the residents of Soweto and white working-class
31 communities are disappearing (Crankshaw, 2008). The corresponding
32 growth of the service economy has been centered on Sandton in the
33 northern suburbs of Johannesburg and has been accompanied by a general
34 decline in economic activity in the CBD (Beavon, 2004). These dynamics
35 have shifted nodes of employment further away from the traditional
36 working-class communities toward the historically wealthy parts of the city
37 (Beall et al., 2002).

38 The degree to which residents across Johannesburg are segregated from
39 one another on the basis of class can be estimated using the index of

Table 6. Class Index of Dissimilarity.

	Upper Middle Class	Middle Middle Class	Lower Middle Class
1996	0.35	0.25	0.18
2001	0.44	0.22	0.20
Change	0.09	-0.04	0.02

dissimilarity. Table 6 presents the index of dissimilarity for each segment of the middle class in both 1996 and 2001. This provides a measure of the extent to which each segment of the middle class is separated from all other groups in the city. The closer the value is to 1, the higher the degree of segregation. This table shows that of the three middle-class groups, the upper middle class is the most segregated from the rest of the urban residents and experiences the largest increase in segregation between the 2 years, suggesting increased class enclavization. The middle middle class on the other hand is much more evenly distributed across the city and becomes slightly less segregated between the 2 years. Finally, the lower middle class experiences the lowest level of segregation in both years, although there is a slight increase in levels of segregation. The higher degree of self-segregation as one moves up the class hierarchy is precisely what the class reproduction literature predicts and a pattern that is well documented in other cases.¹² But if Johannesburg confirms the general relationship of a strong correlation between class and space, the actual geography of class privilege is much more consolidated than is normally the case in class-divided cities.

GIS allows us to create maps of neighborhoods across the city and to in effect visualize patterns of class concentration and segregation. In order to familiarize the reader with the geography of the city, Fig. 2 labels key sites throughout the city.

Figs. 3–6 demonstrate the spatial distribution of each segment of the middle class across Johannesburg.¹³ Fig. 3 shows that over the relatively short span of 5 years, there have been dramatic and visible changes in the spatial distribution of the upper middle class in Johannesburg. While in 1996, this group lived predominantly in the wealthier northern suburbs of the city, there were still some pockets of upper middle-class communities in the southern part of the city, including in the township of Soweto. However, by 2001, the upper middle class became much more concentrated in the northern part of the city, particularly around the growing financial and service hub of Sandton. While the northern suburbs are becoming increasingly homogeneous in terms of class, there is evidence that they are

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Fig. 2. Johannesburg.

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becoming more racially diverse (Crankshaw, 2008). It appears that the upper middle-class residents from the townships have moved to the increasingly clustered upper middle-class communities in the wealthy northern suburbs, providing strong evidence of increased class segregation and retrenchment of the upper middle class in a pattern that is not necessarily racially determined.

The magnitude of clustering of the upper middle class in the northern suburbs can be seen in the local indicators of spatial association (LISA) map in Fig. 4. An LISA map is used to identify clusters by comparing a given




Fig. 3. Spatial Distribution of the Upper Middle Class.



Fig. 4. LISA Cluster Maps of the Upper Middle Class.




Fig. 5. Spatial Distribution of the Middle Middle Class.

value within a unit to the values of its neighbors. Contiguous units with high values for the variable of interest are identified in light gray. Clusters of contiguous low values for the variable of interest are identified in dark gray. Fig. 4 shows that in both 1996 and 2001, there are obvious clusters of communities with a high percentage of residents in the upper middle class relative to their neighbors in the northern part of the city, whereas clusters of low values can be seen in the southern part of the city. Between the two regions, a division can be seen where communities and their neighbors do not share values similar enough in terms of class composition to be considered a cluster. The magnitude of clustering can be estimated using the Moran's I statistic, which measures the correlation between neighbors – the higher the Moran's I, the greater the degree of clustering. In 1996, the Moran's I for Johannesburg was 0.67, indicating a high degree of clustering. By 2001, the value had increased to 0.72, indicating increased clustering of the upper middle class. The large high-high cluster in the north points to a solid block of upper middle-class retrenchment. The fact that this high-high cluster stands in such sharp contrast to and distance from the low-low

1 This transitional band is the site of many of the city’s apartheid-era
 3 working-class white neighborhoods and provides affordable housing outside
 5 the townships for the upwardly mobile black middle and lower middle class.
 7 For those residents of Soweto who make their way into the lower middle
 class and chose to leave, this transitional band is much more economically
 accessible than the northern suburbs where housing prices tend to be
 significantly higher.

9 These maps illustrate the importance of disaggregating the middle class in
 11 order to better understand the spatial dynamics taking place within this
 13 group. Arguments about the dramatic polarization of the middle class
 15 neglect the diversity of dynamics within that group itself. Spatial class
 17 retrenchment is largely driven by the upper middle class rather than the
 19 middle and lower middle class. The upper middle class is becoming more
 21 enclavized, that is, spatially concentrated and geographically removed,
 23 which in turn implies the spatial fragmentation of the middle class. Table 7
 25 further underscores this dynamic by examining the correlation between
 27 middle-class status and distance from Sandton, the financial and service hub
 29 of Johannesburg. This is in other words a spatial measure of the
 31 correspondence between class, residence, and post-Fordist economic
 activity. The correlation coefficients show a negative correlation between
 a community’s distance from Sandton and the percent of that community’s
 population that is upper and middle middle class, indicating that as distance
 from Sandton increases, the percent of the population in each community
 that is upper and middle middle class decreases, signaling a concentration of
 the upper and middle middle class in the northern suburbs. The correlation
 is much higher for the upper middle class, confirming that this class is
 spatially concentrated around the dominant pole of South Africa’s new
 economy. Between the 2 years, this pattern is magnified for the upper middle
 class, while there is a significant decline in this effect among the middle
 middle class. From our earlier examination of the maps, we can infer that
 this in large part reflects the increasing numbers of middle middle class

Table 7. Distance from Sandton and Class Composition.

	1996	2001
Upper middle class	-0.499**	-0.523**
Middle middle class	-0.307**	-0.108**
Lower middle class	0.203**	0.257**

** $p < 0.01$.

1 urban residents who live in Soweto. In contrast to these two middle-class
3 segments, the further from Sandton a community is, the higher the percent
5 of its population is in the lower middle class, a trend that increases across
7 these 2 years. This suggests that the concentration of the lower middle class
9 is moving away from the northern suburbs as evidenced by the increase in
11 this group in Soweto.

Soweto

11 The case of Soweto provides an opportunity for examination of what is
13 occurring in the townships as Johannesburg's economy becomes more
15 service oriented. Under apartheid and until today, Soweto has been home to
17 about half of Johannesburg's African population. In 2001, 2,374,594
19 Africans lived in Johannesburg and approximately 1,096,339 lived in
21 Soweto.¹⁴ Under the apartheid regime, basic services and infrastructure in
23 Soweto were severely underdeveloped, and strict limitations were placed on
25 the ability of Soweto's African residents to start businesses or occupy
27 middle- and upper-income jobs, creating a poor and underresourced
29 community. Given this legacy, a plausible case can be made that the shift
31 to a post-Fordist economy that has taken place in Johannesburg has further
33 exacerbated the limits to upward mobility for Sowetans. Specifically, the
35 geographic location of service industry jobs in the northern part of the city
37 may have created a spatial mismatch between Soweto's labor force and the
39 location of employment opportunities. This reasoning has led Crankshaw
(2008), among others, to argue that as apartheid-era residential restrictions
were removed and Soweto's upper middle class moved north at the same
time that the city's economy became increasingly reliant on service jobs
concentrated in the northern part of Johannesburg, Soweto was left behind.
Table 8 shows that between 1996 and 2001, the occupational structure of
Soweto has shifted along with the economy. Comparable to the city as a
whole, there has been an increase in employment in occupations associated
with the service economy and a corresponding decline in traditional
manufacturing occupations. Despite this growth in the middle class, as
Crankshaw (2008) and others (Seekings & Natrass, 2005) point out,
unemployment is a key feature in understanding changing class dynamics in
South Africa. While the middle class has grown in Soweto, this growth is
accompanied by increased unemployment,¹⁵ suggesting that the types of
economic transitions occurring among residents of Soweto are incredibly
varied and more complicated than the mere ghettoization of the area.

Table 8. Occupational Structure of Soweto.

	% 1996 (<i>n</i>)	% 2001 (<i>n</i>)	Change 2001–1996
Legislators, Senior officials, Managers	2.70 (7,190)	3.68 (9,341)	0.98 (2,151)
Professionals	8.34 (22,210)	4.95 (12,548)	-3.39 (-9,662)
Technicians and associate Professionals	6.57 (17,504)	10.12 (25,646)	3.55 (8,142)
Clerks	12.44 (33,123)	17.63 (44,693)	5.19 (11,570)
Service and sales Occupations	13.31 (35,446)	14.70 (37,277)	1.39 (1,831)
Agriculture and fishing	0.58 (1,548)	0.35 (885)	-0.23 (-663)
Craft and trade Occupations	20.93 (55,736)	15.62 (39,590)	-5.31 (-16,146)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	13.05 (34,757)	11.55 (29,282)	-1.5 (-5,475)
Elementary occupations	22.08 (58,790)	21.40 (54,252)	-0.68 (-4,538)
<i>N</i>	266,304	253,514	-12,790

Table 9. Middle Class in Soweto.

	% of Employed – 1996 (<i>n</i>)	% of Employed – 2001 (<i>n</i>)	Change 2001–1996
Upper middle class	11.04 (29,400)	8.63 (21,889)	-2.41 (-7,511)
Middle middle class	6.57 (17,504)	10.12 (25,646)	3.55 (8,142)
Lower middle class	25.75 (68,569)	32.33 (81,970)	6.58 (13,401)
<i>N</i>	115,473	129,505	14,032

These changes in the occupational structure of Soweto have resulted in shifts within the middle class. As shown in Table 9, the middle class in Soweto is growing, but this growth is taking place primarily within the middle and lower middle classes. Between 1996 and 2001, there is in fact a dramatic outmigration of professionals, lending support to the hypothesis that with the end of apartheid, upper middle-class Africans moved out of the townships and into the wealthier northern suburbs. At the same time,

1 however, the population that remained saw upward mobility into the ranks
of the middle and lower middle class. The growth of the middle middle class
3 (technicians and associate professionals) is striking, and within the lower
middle class the growth is entirely driven by the category of clerks, which
5 represents the higher end of the income distribution within the lower middle
class. In sum, Soweto has experienced a significant expansion of the middle
7 of the middle class. This expansion in turn suggests that within certain
pockets of Soweto, a transition is taking place from a ghetto – a residential
9 area in which people are trapped – to an ethnic enclave, an area in which
people from a single ethnic group chose to live.¹⁶ This in turn points to the
11 impact of postapartheid policies. First and maybe most importantly,
following the end of apartheid, titles to government-owned houses in
13 Soweto were transferred to their occupants, providing a key incentive to
remain in the township.¹⁷ Second, as part of the Johannesburg government's
15 commitment to addressing the service backlog in townships, Soweto has
received significant investments of infrastructure and services, including
17 electrification, improved access to water, and the paving of the townships
roads.

19

21

Northern Suburbs

23 As the center of the growing service economy, the northern suburbs provide
a stark contrast to Soweto. In order to more closely examine class dynamics
25 within this part of the city, those subplaces that are part of the 2001 upper
middle-class cluster identified in the map in Fig. 4 were examined as a whole.
27 Table 10 shows that the largest difference between Soweto and the northern
suburbs is at the higher end of the occupational structure. The northern
29 suburbs see a positive increase in the proportion of professionals, whereas
Soweto is seeing a large decline in this category between 1996 and 2001. This
31 suggests that upward class mobility among the city's African population is
reflected spatially as apartheid residential restrictions are lifted. While the
33 increases in the upper end of the occupational structure are greater in the
northern suburbs than Soweto, shifts in the middle of the occupational
35 structure are relatively small, with a slight decline in technicians and
associate professionals and only small increases in clerks and service and
37 sales occupations relative to Soweto.

While in Soweto the middle and lower middle class are seeing substantial
39 growth, as can be seen in Table 11, it is the upper middle class that is
growing in the northern suburbs. This growth coincides with a small decline

Table 10. Occupational Structure in Northern Suburbs.

	1996 (n)	2001 (n)	Change 2001–1996
Legislators, Senior officials, managers	14.48 (18,326)	16.50 (29,003)	2.02 (10,677)
Professionals	20.67 (26,166)	25.77 (45,287)	5.10 (19,121)
Technicians and associate professionals	13.98 (17,692)	13.39 (23,540)	-0.59 (5,848)
Clerks	9.43 (11,939)	10.83 (19,033)	1.40 (7,094)
Service and sales occupations	7.54 (9,539)	7.80 (13,718)	0.26 (4,179)
Agriculture and fishing	3.75 (4,752)	0.49 (858)	-3.26 (-3,894)
Craft and trade occupations	5.69 (7,200)	3.37 (5,919)	-2.32 (-1,281)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	1.62 (2,057)	1.25 (2,197)	-0.37 (140)
Elementary occupations	22.84 (28,919)	20.60 (36,210)	-2.24 (7,291)
<i>N</i>	126,590	175,765	49,175

Table 11. Middle Class in Northern Suburbs.

	% of Employed – 1996 (n)	% of Employed – 2001 (n)	Change 2001–1996
Upper middle class	35.15 (44,492)	42.27 (74,290)	7.12 (29,798)
Middle middle class	13.98 (17,692)	13.39 (23,540)	-0.59 (5,848)
Lower middle class	16.97 (21,478)	18.63 (32,751)	1.66 (11,273)
<i>N</i>	83,662	130,878	

in the middle middle class and a slight growth in the lower middle class. These trends offer further evidence of the growing retrenchment of the upper middle class in the northern suburbs.

The northern stretches of Johannesburg increasingly resemble Marcuse’s “totalizing suburb,” or Garreau’s (1991) “edge city,” combining business activities, employment centers, commercial and cultural facilities with the residential. But in contrast to the US pattern in which edge cities

1 compliment the originating urban cores, the northern suburbs have
developed at the expense of the CBD.¹⁸ Johannesburg's past imparts to
3 this process of "separate development" its own internal dynamic of social
fragmentation. There is in fact a double-enclavization at work. Not only is
5 the north becoming an enclave of upper middle class privilege increasingly
disconnected from the rest of the city, it is itself being parcellized into
7 securitized enclaves. Increasing perceptions of insecurity and fear of crime
have driven the middle and upper classes into gated communities
9 characterized by high levels of security and limited social interaction
beyond the neighborhood walls (Lemanski, 2006). A large number of the
11 older suburbs have established security checkpoints on roads, erected
booms, and in general tried to patrol the boundaries of the neighborhood.
13 Almost all new developments in the north are gated communities, and
business parks, entertainment complexes, and malls are all highly
15 securitized. Czeglédy concludes his survey of the architectural features of
these new spaces by remarking that "the distinctly architectonic features of
17 the post-apartheid city increasingly symbolize entrenched divisions between
private and public life and between the individual and the state" (2003, p.
19 22). There is also some evidence that despite the general patterns of
deracialization of the northern suburbs, new patterns of racial segregation
21 are emerging. Jurgens, Gnad, and Bahr (2003) found the new developments
they studied to be quite racially homogenous and argue that price
23 differentials and images of individual residential areas are steering different
ethnic groups into different developments. Reviewing the general climate of
25 insecurity and fear that has become a pervasive part of life in Johannesburg,
Bremner comes to a stark conclusion: "Johannesburg today is a city of
27 walls, substitutes for the invisible walls of apartheid through which the
Other was kept in its place" (Bremner, 2004, p. 464).

29 In addition to concerns with security, this upper middle-class enclaviza-
tion is likely a product of status preservation. Interviews with residents
31 reveal that members of prestigious professions are often encouraged by
employers and real estate agents to live in the exclusive northern suburbs.
33 This occupational clustering and residential enclavization can be directly
tied to a range of assets that are critical to upper middle-class reproduction.
35 The northern suburbs contain the vast majority of the city's high-end malls,
entertainment facilities (with the notable exception of soccer stadia), private
37 clubs, and parks. Most significantly, the bulk of the city's best schools are
located in this area. Almost all of the city's prestigious private schools are in
39 the northern suburbs, but even more strikingly the area's public schools are
almost uniformly high-performing. Thus, in 2001, schools that were located

1 in the upper middle-class cluster had an average fail rate on South Africa's
2 high school exam of 2.48%, and only a single school in the entire region had
3 a failure rate that was above the Soweto average of 11.36%.¹⁹

4 The northern suburbs are clearly becoming more class exclusive, but they
5 are also becoming much more powerful. Thus, in the northern suburbs, the
6 proportion of legislators, senior officials, and managers category increases
7 more dramatically than in Soweto, the traditional home of the ANC
8 leadership. Though we can't break down these numbers, all the evidence
9 would suggest that much of this increase has been driven by the migration of
10 the elite political class into the northern suburbs. Most prominent ANC
11 officials live in the north, and even at lower ends of the party there is a clear
12 status premium on living in these neighborhoods. In conducting fieldwork in
13 townships across the city, a common complaint we heard from residents is
14 that their ward councilors (elected officials) have all moved to Sandton
15 (Heller, 2003). The increased geographical concentration of state and party
16 elites in and around Sandton reinforces arguments made by Southall (2004)
17 and others that state policies of BEE have helped forge a black bourgeoisie
18 through closer state-private sector ties.

19

21

CONCLUSION

23 Since the collapse of apartheid, dramatic shifts have occurred within
24 Johannesburg's middle class. In contrast to the social polarization thesis
25 (Sassen, 2001), the evidence presented here suggests that the middle class
26 was not hollowed out but instead grew in the years immediately following
27 the end of apartheid. This period saw a significant increase in the size of the
28 middle class overall, with substantial growth among the service, sales, and
29 clerk occupations that comprise the lower middle class. As Borel-Saladin
30 and Crankshaw (2008) point out, these jobs are often well paid and are not
31 necessarily associated with a decline in income relative to manufacturing
32 jobs. In terms of income and occupational structure then, there is clear
33 evidence that Johannesburg's economic transformation is producing a large,
34 and racially diverse, middle class. This image lends support to official
35 discourses that trumpet the middle class as the harbinger of a new,
36 prosperous, and diverse South Africa. But when one disaggregates the
37 middle class, a more complex picture emerges. Our findings are summarized
38 in Table 12.

39 In the period we examine, the upper middle class expanded rapidly. The
increase in the category of legislators, managers, and senior officials marks

1 **Table 12.** Middle-Class Formation and Fragmentation Summarized.

	% of Employed in 2001	Size of Growth 1996–2001	Change in Level of Residential Segregation	Spatial Pattern	Racial Change
Upper	19.67	47,634	Increase	Enclavized around Sandton	Proportionate decrease in Africans
Middle	10.50	29,231	Slight decline	More spread out and increase in Soweto	Large proportionate increase in Africans
Lower	28.25	80,064	Slight increase	More spread out and increase in Soweto	Proportionate increase in Africans

17 the expansion of the state while the rise in professionals reflects
 19 Johannesburg's increased role as a services and information hub and as a
 regional world city, the entrepot for foreign capital entering Southern Africa
 (Beavon, 2004). However, the racial composition of this class has changed
 21 only marginally, and whites have largely maintained their dominant
 position despite BEE and aggressive policies of affirmative action.²⁰ Most
 23 dramatic of all, this class has entrenched itself in the northern suburbs,
 including both the traditional elite suburbs on the edge of the CBD and the
 25 gated greenfield developments surrounding Sandton and pushing out
 northwards in Midrand. This class has in fact become so residentially
 27 concentrated that it has all but abandoned the southern half of the city, and
 it is now possible to identify a large continuous upper middle-class enclave
 29 along the northern half of the M1 (the principle north–south highway).

Lower and middle middle class formation has followed markedly different
 31 patterns. The middle middle class – associate professionals and technicians –
 has experienced much more significant deracialization. This class tends to
 33 enjoy job protection and high rates of unionization and occupies a very
 comfortable position in South Africa. The middle middle class has become
 35 spatially less concentrated and can be found in the north as well as in the
 south of the city. The lower middle class, which consists of low-skilled
 37 white-collar workers, has grown dramatically. In terms of income, this class
 occupies the very middle of the South African class structure and more or
 39 less mirrors the racial distribution in South Africa. Residentially, it has
 become much more concentrated in the southern part of the city.

1 Overall, the spatial dynamics of class restructuring are clear cut. As our
2 cluster analysis showed rather dramatically, the city has quite literally been
3 split in two. The north has become an even larger and more continuous
4 enclave of privilege than under apartheid. The formation of this enclave
5 moreover reveals a near perfect homology of the structural and reproductive
6 dimensions of class. Thus, the geographical reconfiguration of the post-
7 Fordist economy around the financial and corporate headquarter functions
8 of Sandton, and the high-tech cluster of Midrand has been accompanied by
9 the consolidation of a totalized suburb of integrated upper middle-class
10 consumption, entertainment, schooling, and housing. If Johannesburg was
11 always a class and race-divided city, its spatial hierarchy has now been fine-
12 tuned to include the middle class. Our spatial analysis reveals that as a
13 neighborhood's distance from Sandton increases, the presence of the upper
14 middle class declines and the presence of the middle and lower classes
15 increases. In sum, the middle class is fragmenting, and this dynamic is
16 largely being driven by the enclavization of upper echelons.

17 What has transpired in Johannesburg in the postapartheid period carries
18 some important lessons for our understanding of class formation and social
19 inequality. The advent of majority rule in South Africa raised the hope that
20 the legacies of apartheid could be reversed and that the city in particular
21 could be transformed. Working with what are by any developing world
22 standards significant resources and high state capacity, the ANC has
23 aggressively pursued policies to deracialize the occupational structure and
24 redistribute public resources, including measures to improve basic service
25 delivery and infrastructure in townships. The impact of these interventions
26 can be seen in Soweto where the size of the middle class has grown
27 significantly. This has been driven on the one hand by affirmative action
28 policies – and probably most decisively by the deracialization of the civil
29 service – as well as the policy of providing titles to township homes but also
30 by significant upgrading of Soweto's infrastructure that has made the
31 township far more attractive to the lower and middle middle class. In this
32 sense, as Soweto has diversified in class terms and not only retained but
33 grown its lower and middle middle class, particular areas have become more
34 of an ethnic enclave than an excluded ghetto.

35 But the impact of public interventions to reverse the legacies of apartheid
36 appears to pale in comparison to the effects of middle-class restructuring.
37 Over the past two decades, the combined effects of business investment and
38 residential development have relocated resources from the center of the city
39 to its northern suburbs and beyond. The four fields that are critical to
middle-class reproduction – employment, housing, consumption, and

1 education (Robson & Butler, 2001, p. 72) – have become increasingly
 3 concentrated and enclavized. Thus even as public policies have sought to
 5 dismantle inherited inequalities, class practices have effectively segregated
 opportunities. Upper middle-class privilege has not only become more
 entrenched but has also been hived off from the rest of the middle class.

7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39

Crankshaw (1996a, 1996b); Lemanski (2004); Marcuse & van Kempen
 (2000); Massey (1996).

NOTES

1. Beavon (2004) has noted that Johannesburg has a metropolitan area greater in
 areal extent than Mexico City that was generally regarded as the world's largest
 urban place in the mid-1980s (241).

2. For one of the most careful overviews, see Savage et al. (1992). In the South
 African context, see Seekings and Natrass (2005, Chap. 7).

3. Wright (1985) produced the first systematic elaboration of this view.
 Goldthorpe's influential work on middle classes in the United Kingdom has often
 been interpreted as in tension with Wright, but a number of commentators have
 argued that the differences are more theoretical than conceptual (Seekings &
 Natrass, 2005).

4. Private developers have dominated the spatial reconfiguration of the city by
 pushing large-scale, high-end greenfield developments of residential areas and
 shopping malls (Beavon, 2004). Beavon shows that between 1991 and 2003 all but 3
 of 27 new malls of over 10,000 m² were in the northern suburbs (2004, Table 249).

5. Based on focus groups and interviews we conducted with residents, public
 officials, and city planners in Johannesburg, we are confident that subplaces do
 indeed correspond to recognizable named neighborhoods. The terms "neighbor-
 hood" and "subplace" are used interchangeably throughout the chapter.

6. While citywide data are used to calculate general trends in Johannesburg, all
 the data on spatial changes presented in second half of this chapter, including the
 calculation of the index of dissimilarity and maps, are based on measurements at the
 subplace level.

7. Seekings and Natrass find that what they call the "intermediate class" – which
 in their complex schema includes "routine white-collar, skilled and supervisory
 workers" (2005, p. 247) and encompasses both skilled manual and our category of
 lower middle class, represented 19% of all households and 22% of income of all
 households, that is the middle (2005, p. 253).

8. At the city level as well as the subplace level, income data are available only in
 banded categories in each of the two census years. Unfortunately, the number of
 bands as well as their range in the 1996 census is different from those in the 2001

1 census (see Leibbrandt et al., 2006). Therefore, it is not possible to calculate a
common median income for each class category that is comparable across the 2
3 years.

9. This includes craft and trade occupations as well as plant and machine
operators and assemblers.

5 10. The proportionate decline in the African upper middle class should not be
overstated. Long-term trends in African employment in these occupations have
7 steadily risen and it is possible that these figures are out of trend (see Crankshaw,
1997).

9 11. Chipkin (2008) argues that government bureaucracies, even under affirmative
action mandates, have found it difficult to staff managerial positions with Africans
because of a lack of qualified candidates. This problem in turn results from an
11 educational system that despite massive affirmative reforms, still fails to produce
sufficient numbers of Africans with graduate degrees.

13 12. For England, see Savage et al. (1992). For Paris, Prêteceille also calculates the
index of dissimilarity and comes up with numbers that parallel our findings: the
15 index for upper middle class occupations in Paris in 1999 averaged around 0.39, but
fell to 0.31 for the middle middle class and 0.20 for the lower middle class (Prêteceille,
2006).

17 13. There are 683 subplaces in metropolitan Johannesburg. For the mapped
comparison of subplaces in this chapter, only those subplaces with a population
density of at least 100 people per square kilometer in both years of measurement are
19 represented in the maps so as to prevent the appearance of dramatic demographic
shifts where in fact there have only been changes among a handful of residents. This
21 leaves 589 communities for the mapping analyses.

14. Based on calculation from StatsSA 2001 Census.

23 15. Between 1996 and 2001, the unemployment rate in Soweto rose from about
43% to about 54%. Based on calculations from StatsSA Census data.

25 16. For a discussion of these terms and analysis of similar dynamics in Durban,
see Schensul and Heller (forthcoming).

27 17. We would like to thank one of the reviewers for highlighting the influence of
this dynamic in shaping the class and residential structure of the townships.

29 18. It is notable, for example, that Johannesburg has not seen a significant trend
of gentrification, a classic strategy of middle-class residential distinction defined by
upwardly mobile professionals moving into areas in or near the old urban core.

19. This is calculated from the Annual Ordinary Schools Survey.

31 20. This would in part help explain the finding in Leibbrandt, Poswell, Naidoo,
and Welch (2006) that after two and a half decades of steady decline, the disparity
33 ratio in per capita income between whites and Africans increased from 9.0 in 1996 to
11.19 in 2001.

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 6 Cape Town and Johannesburg for sharing data with us. The data reported
 7 in this chapter can be accessed and mapped at the web site “Urban
 8 Transformation in South Africa” [http://www.s4.brown.edu/southafrica/
 9 homepage.htm](http://www.s4.brown.edu/southafrica/homepage.htm).

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17 APPENDIX. OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES

19 *Legislators, Officials, and Senior Managers*

21 Legislators

23 Senior government officials

Traditional chiefs and heads of villages

25 Senior officials of special-interest organizations

Directors and chief executives

27 Production and operations managers

Other managers

29 General managers

Armed forces and civil service managers

31 *Professionals*

35 Physicists and astronomers

Mathematicians, statisticians, and related professionals

37 Computing professionals

Architects, engineers, and related professionals

39 Physical sciences technologists

Life science professionals

- 1 Health professionals
 - Nursing and midwifery professionals
- 3 Higher education teaching professionals
 - Secondary education teaching professionals
- 5 Primary and preprimary education teaching professionals
 - Special education teaching professionals
- 7 Other teaching professionals
 - Other education professionals
- 9 Business professionals
 - Legal professionals
- 11 Archivists, librarians, and related information professionals
 - Social science and related professionals
- 13 Writers and creative or performing artists
 - Religious professionals
- 15 Other professionals

17

Technicians and Associate Professionals

19

- Natural and engineering science technicians
- 21 Computer associate professionals
 - Optical and electronic equipment operators
- 23 Ship/aircraft controllers and technicians
 - Safety and quality inspectors
- 25 Life science technicians and related associate professionals
 - Modern health associate professionals
- 27 Nursing and midwifery associate professionals
 - Traditional medicine practitioners and faith healers
- 29 Primary education teaching associate professionals
 - Preprimary education teaching associate professionals
- 31 Special education teaching associate professionals
 - Other teaching associate professionals
- 33 Finance and sales associate professionals
 - Business services agents and trade brokers
- 35 Administrative associate professionals
 - Customs, tax, and related government associate professionals
- 37 Police inspectors and detectives
 - Social work associate professionals
- 39 Artistic, entertainment, and sports associate professionals
 - Religious associate professionals

1 Armed forces and civil service associate professionals
Other associate professionals

3

5

Clerks

7

Secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks

9

Numerical clerks

Material-recording and transport clerks

11

Library, mail, and related clerks

Cashiers, tellers, and related clerks

13

Client information clerks

Other office clerks and clerks

15

17

Service and Sales Occupations

19

Travel attendants and related workers

21

Housekeeping and restaurant services workers

Personal care workers

23

Astrologers, fortune-tellers, and related workers

Protective services workers

25

Fashion and other models

Shop salespersons and demonstrators

27

Stall and market salespersons

Armed forces and civil service workers

29

Other personal services workers

31

33

Agriculture and Fishing

35

Market gardeners and crop growers

Dairy and livestock producers

37

Market-oriented crop and animal producers

Forestry and related workers

39

Fishery workers, hunters, and trappers

Subsistence agricultural and fishery workers

1 *Craft and Trade Occupations*

- 3 Miners, shotfirers, stonecutters, and carvers
- Building frame and related trades workers
- 5 Building finishers and related trades workers
- Painters, building structure cleaners, and related trades workers
- 7 Metal, machinery, and related trades workers
- Blacksmiths, tool makers, and related trades workers
- 9 Machinery mechanics and fitters
- Electrical and electronic equipment mechanics and fitters
- 11 Precision workers in metal and related materials
- Potters, glass makers, and related trades workers
- 13 Handicraft workers in wood, textile, leather, and related materials
- Printing and related trades workers
- 15 Food processing and related trades workers
- Wood treaters, cabinet makers, and related trades workers
- 17 Textile, garment, and related trades workers
- Pelt, leather and shoemaking trades workers
- 19 Other craft and related trades workers

21 *Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers*

- 23 Mining and mineral-processing plant operators
- 25 Metal-processing plant operators
- Glass, ceramics, and related plant operators
- 27 Wood-processing and paper-making plant operators
- Chemical-processing plant operators
- 29 Power production and related plant operators
- Automated assembly-line and industrial robot operators
- 31 Metal and mineral products machine operators
- Chemical products machine operators
- 33 Rubber and plastic products machine operators
- Wood products machine operators
- 35 Printing, binding, and paper-products machine operators
- Textile, fur, and leather products machine operators
- 37 Food and related products machine operators
- Assemblers
- 39 Locomotive engine drivers and related workers
- Motor vehicle drivers and related workers

- 1 Agricultural and other mobile plant operators
Ships deck crews and related workers
3 Other machine operators and assemblers

5

Elementary Occupations

7

- Street vendors and related workers
9 Shoe cleaning and other street service occupations
Domestic and related helpers, cleaners, and launderers
11 Building caretakers, window, and related cleaners
Messengers, porters, doorkeepers, and related workers
13 Garbage collectors and related laborers
Agricultural, fishery, and related laborers
15 Mining and construction laborers
Manufacturing laborers
17 Transport laborers and freight handlers

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